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Harris: The Role and Work of Bomber Command: A Note by Air Marshal Sir Ar

The Role and Work
of Bomber Command
A note by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris for the Prime
Minister and War Cabinet, prepared at the request of the
Prime Minister, 28th June 1942
Editor's Note: Few senior Allied Commanders have been criticized as strongly as Air Marshal Sir
Arthur Harris. And even those critics who recognize the vital contribution Harris and Bomber
Command made to the defeat of Nazi Gennany are disturbed by the tone of Harris' letters to
Churchill and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal. Harris never wavered in his conviction that
Germany could be defeated by strategic bombing with ground troops assigned to a secondary
role. This view underlay his arguments for assigning priority to strategic bombing. In pursuing
the case Harris mixed careful argument and clear logic with emotional attacks on those who
doubted his doctrines. Thefollowing note, written shortly qfter Harris assumed command, displays
Harris at his best, arguing the casefor Bomber Command "as the only means qfbringing assistance
to Russia in time" and the only means "which will make subsequent invasion a possible proposition."

1. Those who advocate the breaking-up of
Bomber Command for the purpose of adding
strength to Coastal and Army Co-operation
Commands and overseas requirements are like
the amateur politician who imagines that the
millennium will arrive through the simple process
of dividing available cash equally between all.
Ignorance of what is available for distribution is
such that he does not realise that the outcome
would be to give every individual £50 once at the
cost of wrecking the entire industrial organisation
and income of the country. Similarly, if the
Medium and Heavy Bomber Operational
Squadrons of Bomber Command were
distributed between the many claimants for
favour on the one hand, none of these claimants
would receive anything more than a mere morsel
towards the satisfaction of their alleged
requirements. On the other hand, our only
offensive weapon against Germany would be
destroyed. One cannot win wars by defending
oneself. The defensive use of offensive weapons
must therefore be reduced to the irreducible
minimum necessary to survival.
2. There is surprising ignorance about the
effective strength of Bomber Command. On an
average, it is able to produce about 30 operational
medium and heavy night bomber squadrons and
siX light bomber squadrons, the latter with no

reserves of aircraft behind them. The firstline
strength of the operational squadrons of Bomber
Command represents no more than 11 per cent
ofthe total operational first-line strength of the
Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm, and well over
half of the effort of this 11 per cent is directed
against Naval and Military targets.
3. People often point to the vast training
organisation behind Bomber Command. It is truly
and necessarily great. What such people fail to
realise, however, is that the Bomber Command
training organisation provides the whole
requirements for reinforcing all the bomber forces
overseas and much else besides. At present, for
instance, it provides 148 pilots per month for
overseas bomber squadrons, including 95
complete crews. In the past this quota has at times
been even higher. In addition to this monthly
output for overseas requirements, Bomber
Command has trained, equipped, and then given
away or lent to Coastal and Overseas Commands
and other claimants, 24 squadrons in the last
year. It also provides the crews of 2 squadrons
employed on special S.O.E. and S.I.S. duties, and
crews to man a great number of experimental and
special training units, which work for all
Commands, at home and overseas. Finally, it is
required from time to time to find from 300 to
400 operational aircraft in order to make up the
107
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1 ,000 or so required to carry out specially heavy
attacks against objectives of major importance.
4. Another common error is to suppose that the
effort of the Command is devoted to the bombing
of targets in Germany remote from and chosen
without reference to the general military and naval
situation. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Approximately 50 per cent of the total operational
effort of Bomber Command during the twelve
months April 1941-March 1942 was directly
employed against the enemy's sea power. During
the last three months the proportion has been
well over 50 per cent. All the remaining efforts of
Bomber Command have great direct effect on the
Naval and Land war situations as a whole.
5. For all practical purposes the squadrons of
Bomber Command have done almost all the airsea mining throughout the War. They have laid
some 2,000 odd mines from the beginning of the
War to December 1941, which accounted for one
known enemy ship per 26.2 mines (it can be
reasonably assumed that at least one unknown
ship was sunk or damaged for every known one).
The Command has enormously increased its
mining efforts since the beginning of March this
year. It is now laying mines at the rate of over a
thousand a month, and already the reports on
sinkings are greatly increased over anything
previously achieved. Amongst particular mining
successes can be counted the closing of the Kiel
Canal to heavy enemy ships for some four months
and the damaging and sinking of several of the
highly specialised Baltic train ferries and
icebreaker ferries on which the enemy is
peculiarly dependent. Also, the sinking by mining
and bombing, according to the evidence from
German wreck charts, of something over 300
enemy-employed ships, and damage to a large
number more. The mining of both Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau, and also other enemy war vessels
and troop transports, some of which are known
to have resulted in great loss oflife, must also be
taken into account.

forays, but since that date, over fifteen months
ago, and almost entirely due to the efforts of
Bomber Command, they have never been able to
sink another British or Allied ship. They have only
just been able to escape and stagger home, both
of them striking air-laid mines on their return
journey. Since their arrival in Kiel for repair,
Scharnhorst is known to have been further hit
and heavily damaged. Gneisenau has been so
heavily hit and damaged by bombs that she has
been taken away to Gdynia and largely
dismantled. There are circumstantial reports that
it has been decided to abandon repair on her.
Prinz Eugen was also hit at Brest by Bomber
Command. The direct result of the damage to
these important ships is that throughout the war
the German Fleet has never been able to operate
as an entity, with all that that implies. It was
directly due to the immobilisation of Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau that Bismarck essayed her lone

raid in the Atlantic and to that fact can be largely
credited her subsequent destruction. To Bomber
Command, therefore, can also largely be credited
the fact that Tirpitz in her turn is now a lone wolf.
7. Additional and direct effects on the war
efficiency of the German Fleet arising from the
efforts of Bomber Command are as follows:
(i) The main enemy Naval base at Kiel has
been repeatedly and very heavily damaged by
bomber attacks. A large number of workshops
have been destroyed and the dockyard workers'
quarters have received vast damage, with all
that that implies in regard to delay in Naval
supply and repair work.
(ii)

Amongst other instances the depot ship

Monte Olivia was bombed and burnt out, with

reported heavy loss of life to submarine ratings
and some of Gneisenau's crew who were living
on board.

6. The story of the Scharnhorst and the
Gneisenau is perhaps an outstanding incident

(iii)
There is no doubt that the morale of
enemy Naval personnel, who largely come from
the German coastal ports, has been seriously
affected by the heavy damage, and the raid-fear
inflicted on these ports and their populace.

of the vast effect of the small Bomber Command
force on the Naval war. These two ships, on their
one and only raid into the Atlantic, did appalling
damage to our shipping, sinking no fewer than
19vessels, totalling 150,000tons. Theyretumed
to Brest to refuel and tum round prior to repeated

8. The six light bomber squadrons of Bomber
Command are responsible for the close support
of the Army in the event of invasion, or in the
event of the Army proceeding overseas. They
provide the bait for Fighter Command without
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which the fighter sweeps would be ineffective,
because the enemy often refuses battle unless
bombers are present. They also provided the
detachments at Malta which so successfully
attacked the enemy's lines of communication.
They are known to have sunk some 51,000 tons
of enemy shipping on that supply line. By direct
bomber attack in European waters, these light
bomber squadrons have sunk some 250,000
tons, seriously damaged 287,000 tons and
damaged a further 380,000 tons.
9. The effects on the enemy's submarine
activities have been equally important. It is known
that repeated interference with submarine crew
training resulted from our mine laying in the
Baltic and the Bight. It is known that, from time
to time, considerable damage has been done to
submarine building yards at Hamburg, Kiel,
Rostock, Emden and other ports. Heavy damage
has been done to the three main submarine Diesel
engine factories at Augsburg, Deutz, and the
Germania yards at Kiel. Damage has also been
done to one of the two main submarine
accumulator factories. In addition, the
widespread damage done to German industry by
Bomber Command, perhaps especially in
Cologne, must have profoundly affected the
submarine campaign. It is known that, at the
submarine building yard at Le Trait, three
submarines under construction were reported
destroyed and between 150 and 200 workmen
employed on them were killed.
10. It can also be safely assumed that damage
has been inflicted on submarines operating from
the French West Coast ports. Although the actual
cause of loss of a submarine which does not
return can seldom be determined, the known
losses inflicted on German shipping remove any
shadow of doubt that some losses, possibly
considerable losses, have been inflicted on the
enemy submarine fleet by Bomber Command's
minelaying.
11. By smashing up the invasion ports and the

invasion barges and shipping concentrations,
there is little doubt that Bomber Command had
impressed upon the enemy the difficulties, if not
the impossibility, of invasion. Indeed, history may
yet show that invasion was prevented by the
Command. It certainly can be if it is attempted in
future.

12. The known results of the bombing raids on
Germany show that they cause vast destruction
and vast embarrassment to the enemy. It would
not be possible in a note to detail a tithe of the
known immense damage occasioned in Germany.
Whilst it takes approximately some 7,000 hours
of flying to destroy one submarine at sea, that
was approximately the amount of flying necessary
to destroy one-third of Cologne, the third largest
city in Germany, in one night, a town of vast
industrial import. 250 of its factories were
damaged or destroyed. This must have gravely
embarrassed the enemy war effort in every
direction. The towns of Rostock, Lubeck, Emden
and Cologne have all been destroyed to or beyond
the point where they can be counted as a liability
rather than an asset to the enemy. The very heavy
damage to the Heinkel Aircraft Factory at Rostock
is known to have gravely affected the Heinkel
output, and is reported to have had the most
serious effect on the enemy's air war on all fronts,
and also at sea. The Focke Wulfworks at Bremen
have also been very seriously damaged.
13. The destruction of the Renault Factory might
be counted as an astounding achievement of
Bomber Command. Achieved in a few hours with
practically no loss it is clearly a major victory
against the enemy's land forces such as no other
of our forces has yet achieved. Through the loss
ofthis factory and the Matford works at Poissy,
the enemy is known, according to the Ministry of
Economic Warfare, to have been permanently
deprived of the armoured fighting vehicles and
transport equipment sufficient for the formation
and maintenance of 10/11 motorised divisions.
The important enemy aircraft factories at
Gennevilliers and Salmsons have been destroyed.
The Goodrich rubber factory, and the Thomson
Houston and Ericsson Electrical gear factory have
also been destroyed, and 16 neighbouring
factories damaged, some "on a tremendous scale."
(Interpretation Report.)
14. One of Germany's most pressing problems
is to maintain her system of internal transport.
The German Transport Minister recently stated
that, unless the problem of improving the
transport facilities inside Germany were solved,
Germany's victory would be imperilled. He said
that in the western and north-western regions of
Germany, where frequent bombing raids had
taken place, the transport service was carried out
under extremely difficult conditions. An
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additional strain is thrown upon the railways by
the diversion of traffic caused by sea-mining, while
the bombing of ports and industrial towns has
been shown to do much incidental damage to the
transport services. It is known that the internal
transport system has recently been put under the
control of the German Minister responsible for
armaments production and that very high
priorities, which must interfere with other
production, have been given to locomotive and
wagon construction, and repair. Concomitant with
this declaration by the Reich Minister, Bomber
Command virtually destroyed the important
rolling-stock works at Cologne and severely
damaged another such works at Bremen.
15. To the negative, but very worthwhile, credit
of Bomber Command can be counted the strain
upon the enemy of maintaining an enormous and
ever-increasing mine-sweeping effort, and also the
establishment and maintenance of the largest
anti-aircraft and A.R.P. organisation in the world.
Some three-quarters of a million personnel are
employed on anti-aircraft duties in Germany. If
one adds to that the A.R.P. services, the damage
and repair organisation and the manufacture of
guns and their anti-aircraft ammunition, and also
the mine-sweeping and mined ship repairing
organisation, there is little doubt that the very
existence of Bomber Command costs the enemy
the whole-time services of at least three million
able-bodied personnel. In addition, Bomber
Command forces the enemy to maintain a large
and rapidly increasing force of night fighters,
which now amounts to some 300 aircraft. Many
of these are Ju.88's, a type which, if released,
could be used effectively for the attack of our
shipping. There is no doubt that, if the Bomber
policy was to be abandoned, the release of this
vast manpower for other essential work would
be of the greatest value to Germany. The release
of the twin-engine fighter bombers and the antiaircraft guns for service on the eastern front and
in the Mediterranean would have a powerful and
perhaps even a decisive effect on those campaigns.
16. The purely defensive use of air power is
grossly wasteful. The Naval employment of
aircraft consists of picking at the fringes of enemy
power, of waiting for opportunities that may never
occur, and indeed probably never will occur, of
looking for needles in a haystack. They attempt
to sever each capillary vein, one by one, when they
could, with much less effort, cut the artery.

Bomber Command attacks the sources of all
Naval power, rather than the fringes of the one
type of enemy Naval operation which obviously
menaces us - the submarine. An outstanding
example of waste of air effort is the taking away
from Bomber Command of all the Hampden
aircraft for conversion to torpedo bombers for
the defence of this country. These squadrons have,
for more than two years, exercised continuous
and direct pressure on Germany. Since allocation
to Coastal Command they have done practically
nothing. It is within the bounds of possibility that
they will never get an opportunity to achieve
anything. The enemy is not such a fool as to flaunt
valuable ships within reach of shore-based
aircraft otherwise than when compelled by
circumstances to do so, and then only on his own
terms as to weather and fighter cover.
17. To sum up, Bomber Command provides our
only offensive action yet pressed home directly
against Germany. All our other efforts are
defensive in their nature, and are not intended to
do more, and can never do more, than enable us
to exist in the face of the enemy. Bomber
Command provides the only means of bringing
assistance to Russia in time. The only means of
physically weakening and nervously exhausting
Germany to an extent which will make subsequent
invasion a possible proposition, and is therefore
the only force which can, in fact, hurt our enemy
in the present or in the future secure our victory.
It is the only type of force which we shall ever be
able to bring directly against Japan.
18. Finally, it is apparent that an extraordinary
lack of sense of proportion affects outside
appreciation of the meaning, extent and results
of Bomber Command's operations. What shouts
of victory would arise if a Commando wrecked
the entire Renault factory in a night, with a loss
of seven men! What credible assumptions of an
early end to the war would follow upon the
destruction of a third of Cologne in an hour and
a half by some swift moving mechanised force
which, with but 200 casualties, withdrew and was
ready to repeat the operation 24 hours later! What
acclaim would greet the virtual destruction of
Rostock and the Heinkel main and subsidiary
factories by a Naval bombardment! All this, and
far more, has been achieved by Bomber
Command; yet there are many who still avert their
gaze, pass by on the other side, and question
whether the 30 Squadrons of night bombers make
any worth-while contribution to the war.
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